Simply lying to police not enough to make you an accessory after the fact to murder, court rules in JP case

The Supreme Judicial Court today overturned Christopher Rivera's conviction for being an accessory after the fact to a 2011 murder in Jamaica Plain, ruling that while he did lie to cops interviewing him about the way his friend fatally stabbed a man in a fight outside a convenience store, none of his lies helped his pal or threw police off the case in any way, as required by the state law that defines "accessories."

A jury had convinced Rivera for statements to police about the murder of Kenneth "Black" Soto in the parking lot of the 7-Eleven at South Huntington Avenue and Centre Street early on Oct. 16, 2011 after Soto got into a fight with Rivera's friend, Hector "Nemo" Soto - no relation - of Roslindale.

A judge sentenced him to 2 1/2 years in jail. Soto, who faced the same jury was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 15 years.

According to an SJC summary, Rivera, who was present during the fight, lied to police detectives who asked him if he had been at the scene - he said he was partying in Hyde Park at the time, when he actually drove away with Soto and even laughed with him about the fight - and refused to provide Soto's phone number and the number of other possible participants when the detectives asked for it.

At issue for the state's highest court - whether Rivera's lies and refusal to provide help rose to the level of crime specified by the state law on accessories:

Whoever, after the commission of a felony, harbors, conceals, maintains or assists the principal felon . . . or gives such offender any other aid, knowing that he has committed a felony . . . with intent that he shall avoid or escape detention, arrest, trial or punishment, shall be an accessory after the fact . . . .

The court continued:

The Commonwealth does not contend that the defendant "harbor[ed]," "conceal[ed]," or "maintain[ed]" Soto, or that he assisted Soto by allowing Soto to come to his home on the morning of the killing. Rather, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant was an accessory after the fact to murder because he lied to the detectives in his interview about his own actions and whereabouts on the morning of the killing; referred to Soto as "Joel," claiming no knowledge of his first or last name or his nickname; and refused to provide the detectives with Soto's telephone number. The Commonwealth contends that, by this conduct, the defendant "aided" or "assisted" Soto in evading capture or punishment for the killing, with the intent to help Soto evade capture or punishment.

The court said evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, yes, Rivera lied to police, but that evidence did not show his lies in any way helped Soto evade capture and conviction, as required by the law; that Rivera's lies were only an attempt to get police to leave him alone. And that, by itself, is enough to toss his conviction, the court said.

[T]he defendant's false statements about driving home alone without stopping provided only himself with a false alibi -- it did not exculpate Soto. And by claiming no knowledge of the crime, apart from what he had heard on the news, and by stating that he knew Soto only by the name "Joel," he also did not give a false narrative of the crime (or, for that matter, any narrative regarding the crime) that could have provided Soto with a defense. We therefore conclude that the defendant's false and misleading statements to the police did not "aid" or "assist" Soto in any way that would suffice for the defendant to be found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to the murder committed by Soto.

But what about refusing to hand over phone numbers requested by the detectives?

The refusal to answer a police officer's questions or provide requested information alone cannot constitute "aid" or "assistance" under [the accessory law], because, unless a person is subpoenaed or ordered by a court to testify, no one has a legal obligation to answer a police officer's questions or to provide information in a criminal investigation. ... Where the defendant here was constitutionally entitled to refuse to provide the police with Soto's telephone number, his failure to do so cannot be deemed "aid" or "assistance" that would subject him to conviction as an accessory after the fact, regardless of his motive for the refusal.

The court continued that, yes, as a liar, Rivera could have possibly been charged with perjury. But again, the court continued, Rivera was not under sworn oath to tell the truth. And prosecutors did not charge him with perjury:

[P]erhaps because the Commonwealth would be unable to prove that the defendant's false statements under the circumstances in this case reasonably could have led the investigators to pursue a materially different course of investigation.

There is a way out of this conundrum, at least for prosecutors - but it would require an act of the legislature, the court said: If it chose, the legislature could enact, and the governor could sign, a law, similar to one already in effect at the federal level, making it explicitly a crime to lie to police investigators during a criminal investigation.